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[Summary] This article looks at the relationship between European integration and 
national foreign and security policy - speciﬁcally, how and to what extent the development 
of a speciﬁcally European (EU) foreign and security policy leads to adaptation and change 
in national foreign and security policy. The theoretical point of departure is an interest in 
national changes in response to EU norms. It will be argued that national approaches tend to 
adapt to norms deﬁned by a community to which they are closely linked; that this adapta-
tion takes place over time, through a socialisation process; and that it may also, in the end, 
lead to changes in national identity. This argument challenges the common assumption of IR 
theory that national identities and/or interests are ﬁxed and independent of structural factors 
like international norms and values. The empirical focus is on changes in French foreign 
and security policy since the early 1990s. How and to what extent has the dominant French 
national discourse on foreign and security policy changed since the early 1990s? And if so, 
how are these changes related to the European integration process in general, and to the 
development of a European foreign and security dimension in particular? 
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Introduction 
This article looks at the relationship between European integration and national foreign and 
security policy - specifically, how and to what extent the development of a specifically 
European (EU) foreign and security policy leads to adaptation and change in national foreign 
and security policy. The theoretical point of departure is an interest in national changes in 
response to EU norms. It will be argued that national approaches tend to adapt to norms 
defined by a community to which they are closely linked; that this adaptation takes place over 
time, through a socialisation process; and that it may also, in the end, lead to changes in 
national identity. This argument challenges the common assumption of IR theory that national 
identities and/or interests are fixed and independent of structural factors like international 
norms and values. The empirical focus is on changes in French foreign and security policy 
since the early 1990s. How and to what extent has the dominant French national discourse on 
foreign and security policy changed since the early 1990s? And if so, how are these changes 
related to the European integration process in general, and to the development of a European 
foreign and security dimension in particular?  
It is widely held that France has had an important impact on various aspects of the 
European integration process, including the development of a European security and defence 
policy. France, it is said, has favoured the development towards a ‘Europe puissance’ – a 
strong and independent European security and defence policy capable of military power 
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projection1 (Howorth 1998: 144). However, we may question whether the French conception 
of ‘Europe puissance’ is in fact what is being implemented in the area of the EU security 
policy. For instance, the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 seems to have 
more elements of a comprehensive security approach – an approach emphasising a holistic 
approach to security, exemplified by conflict prevention and civil military crisis management 
– rather than elements of military power projection. If so, this could be interpreted as an 
indication of a somewhat reduced French influence over the integration process in this area, or 
perhaps that France’s ambitions for European foreign and security policy have changed. 
Elsewhere, I have shown how the EU has developed a foreign and security policy discourse 
independent of its member-states, and that this EU discourse has influenced the security 
approaches of some of its smaller member-states (Rieker, forthcoming). This article 
investigates whether a similar influence can be observed in a large member-state like France.  
I begin by showing how the EU can be understood as a comprehensive security actor 
and how processes of Europeanisation can be studied in relation to this policy area. The 
second part of the article focuses on the changes in French foreign and security policy 
discourse from the early 1990s and until 2004, and discusses whether these changes may be 
understood in relation to certain major changes in the EU in this particular period.   
 
Europeanisation of national security approaches 
The EU may be described as a security community. However, while Deutsch understood 
integration as the creation of security communities among states in a region without formal 
statehood, Adler and Barnett’s concept of tightly coupled pluralistic security communities 
better captures the EU’s special kind of ‘actorness’, which is characterised by a high level of 
political integration without being a federation (Adler and Barnett 1996). With the EU 
becoming an increasingly important provider of security, as well as being more integrated (or 
more tightly coupled) than other multilateral frameworks, there is good reason to expect that 
its security approach will also have an impact on how security is defined at the national level 
- both in EU member-states and in states closely linked to this community. While such a 
                                                 
1 Power Projection is a term used in military and International Relations circles referring to the ability of a state to implement 
policy by means of force. Usually, power projection refers to the ability to do so far away from the territory of the state. 
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pluralistic security community does not necessarily erode the legitimacy of the state or replace 
the state, the more integrated or tightly coupled it is, the more the role or identity of the state 
will be transformed. Several scholars have studied the influence on EU on national 
institutions and policies, but less attention has been paid to the Europeanisation of national 
foreign and security policy approaches (some exceptions: Tonra, 2001; Aggestam, 2004). 
Building on my previous work on the Europeanisation of the Nordic countries security 
approaches (Rieker, forthcoming), this article represents a further attempt to fill this gap. 
 
The EU as a comprehensive security actor  
To be able to study the Europeanisation of French foreign and security policy, we must first 
clarify the character of the independent variable of the analysis – the EU’s foreign and 
security policy. In fact, assuming both that the EU is an actor and that it has a distinct security 
approach is controversial. For a long time the main opposition stood between those who 
perceived European integration solely as an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, and those 
who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state.2 The analysis in this article 
is based on the assumption that the European integration process has gradually consolidated 
parts of Europe as a political actor, but without having become a supranational state – a 
tightly coupled security community. This means that the focus here will be limited to 
describing the actual functioning of the EU as a security actor, rather than the underlying 
mechanisms that can explain the development of EU’s foreign and security policy. Accepting 
that the integration process is an open-ended and even a reversible process, I will analyse how 
the Union’s current discourse and actions affect national foreign and security policy.  
There are two very different stories that can be told about EU security policy. Some 
would argue that the EU has no security policy of importance. In their view, the deep division 
among important EU countries in relation to the Iraq war provided final confirmation of the 
absence of any EU security policy – or at least that it was simply declaratory. Further, it is 
argued, when really important issues arise on the agenda, the larger states in the EU will stick 
to their national interests. According to this argument, therefore, also the future prospects for 
an EU security policy are weak. Others, however, would argue that the period after the Iraq 
                                                 
2 For an introduction to this debate see Rosamond (2000). 
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war has been one of considerable intensity in relation to security policy, even though the EU 
cannot yet be characterised as a unitary actor (Cooper. The development in EU security and 
defence policy (ESDP) since 2003 clearly shows that the ESDP has moved beyond 
declaration and become operational.3 The increased institutionalisation of a common security 
policy at the EU level also indicates that, despite its intergovernmental character, this policy 
area involves more than merely the sum of the EU’s member-states.   
Whether or not it is possible to argue that the EU has developed a distinct security 
approach also depends on how security is defined. While there is general agreement that there 
is a relationship between integration and security, those who defend a traditional definition of 
security may tend to ignore the EU as a significant security actor. Especially the EU’s lack of 
effective military capabilities makes it difficult for them to characterise the Union as a 
security actor (Bull 1983; Walt 1991; Hill 1993; Kagan 2003). For those who understand 
security in a broader sense, however, the situation will look quite different. For them the 
Union’s potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and 
military – makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War world 
(Wæver 1995; Manners 2002; Sjursen 2004; Rieker forthcoming).  
Of the various external factors that have influenced the development of an EU security 
policy, most important is probably the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a changed 
European security context. While existing multilateral security policy frameworks like NATO 
and the OSCE have adapted to this new environment, the most interesting development has 
occurred within the EU – the only multilateral framework with no security-policy legacy from 
the Cold War period. While its lack of a security policy legacy is a consequence of reluctance 
on the part of the member-states to relinquish national sovereignty in the traditional security 
area, it also seems that this reluctance actually has facilitated the development of an 
‘innovative’ security approach. Thus, it may be argued, the development of an EU security 
policy has not been hampered by a difficult transformation process in the area of security and 
defence more generally. Instead this has actually facilitated the development of a different and 
                                                 
3 For instance, in 2003 the EU took over UN’s police mission in Bosnia; it took over NATO’s peacekeeping mission in 
Macedonia; and it undertook its first peace enforcement operation outside of Europe, in Congo. In addition the member-states 
agreed on several issues that will further strengthen the EU’s security policy, the most important being the adoption of an EU 
Security Strategy (ESS) that defines threats, objectives and policy implications for the EU. (European Council 2003) In 
December 2004, the EU also took over NATO’s Stabilisation Force in Bosnia.a 
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more comprehensive security approach in which military means are but one part of a whole 
range of security policy means.  
Ever since the mid-1990s, it is such a comprehensive security approach4 that has been 
emphasised by the EU itself, through its official documents and speeches. This approach is 
not merely declaratory: the EU has also managed to transform the ideas inherent in this 
discourse into concrete policy. This has been the case in the shaping of a comprehensive 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - first with the incorporation of the Petersberg 
tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, which shifted the focus from the development of a ‘common 
defence’ towards ‘international crisis management’, and then with the establishment of a 
civilian crisis management component in parallel to the military one. Other examples of 
comprehensive security on the ‘softer’ side include the enlargement process as such and the 
programme for Conflict Prevention together with the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, as well as the various efforts made in the areas of Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) and the Community (EC) in order to combat terrorism This shows that 
the EU, despite the lack of a coherent and clearly defined Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) - as clearly shown by the dispute over the Iraq crisis - does have a distinct 
security approach, one which is implemented both by the Commission and the Council, and 
which in addition to CFSP includes parts of both the Economic Community and Justice and 
Home Affairs.  
Before the EU can become an efficient comprehensive security actor, some important 
improvements must be made. It has been argued, for instance, that a bridge between the 
different policy areas is still lacking (den Boer & Monar, 2002: 11). However, both the 
members and the EU as such have expressed their wish to strengthen this potential. The 
adoption of a European Security Strategy indicates a clear will to have this further reflected in 
the functioning of the EU (European Council 2003). But the issue of coherence is not 
confined to the integration of the security policy tools: it is also about the relations between 
the community pillar and the intergovernmental pillar within the EU, between the EU and its 
member-states, and the EU and other organisations (Gourlay 2004; Keane 2004). A potential 
                                                 
4 While the concept is generally referred to in relation to studies of environmental security (Westing 1989; Dokken 1997), it 
will here be used to refer to a holistic security approach that includes both internal and external security mechanisms. This is 
in accordance with Katzenstein (1996: 3), who emphasises the social, economic and political aspects of security rather than 
focusing narrowly on the explicitly coercive dimensions of state policy. 
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structural solution was proposed in the Constitutional Treaty. Several of the proposals in the 
Treaty - such as a ‘double-hatted’ Foreign Minister, supported by a Joint External Service, a 
solidarity clause, and structured cooperation in the area of security and defence (with the 
creation of multi-national battle groups) - indicated a clear political will to have this further 
reflected in the future functioning of the EU (European Convention 2004). However, now that 
the Treaty has been rejected by referenda held in France and the Netherlands, the political 
elites will have to find a different solution to this problem. 
The recent rejection of the Constitutional Treaty does not mark the end of the EU as a 
security actor. In fact, the Union’s ambitions in the field of security have been singled out in 
the ESS and in the newly adopted capability Headline Goal for the period 2004-2010. It is 
also interesting to note that there is a large popular support for strengthening the EU in this 
policy area (Eurobarometer 2004). Two important policy analyses undertaken for the EU - 
the proposed Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Study Group on Europe's Security 
Capabilities 2004) and the proposed European Defence Strategy (Lindley-French and Algieri 
2004) - provide specific proposals on how to implement the strategy. All three documents 
emphasise the need for a comprehensive security approach that can go beyond the traditional 
distinction between external and internal security, and between civilian and military 
instruments.  
Using Robert Cooper’s terminology, this is what one may call a post-modern security 
approach. In a recent book, Cooper distinguishes between three different phases in European 
history. He describes the period before the establishment of the system of nation states in 
1648 as the pre-modern phase, the period after 1648 as the modern phase and finally the post-
Cold War era as the post-modern period, which is characterised by abandoning the power of 
balance system and by the acceleration of a period of political integration (Cooper 2003). 
Cooper further argues that the EU must be considered as the most developed post-modern 
system since the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is being erased, states are 
giving up their traditional monopoly on violence, and [internal] borders are increasingly 
irrelevant (Cooper 2003: 36-37).  
According to this logic, one may argue that it is the special character of the EU – the 
fact that the EU is an institutional hybrid between an international organisation and a federal 
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state,5 and the fact that it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past – that 
makes it post-modern. While the first opens up for other forms of governance than the ones 
we are used to, the second makes it easier to develop an innovative (comprehensive) security 
approach. Thus, rather than being the result of the influence of a particular (or a certain group 
of) member-states, the Union’s current security approach seems to be a result of the special 
character of the integration process and the fact that the EU did not have an institutionalised 
security policy in the past. As Craig Parsons argues, one certain idea of European integration 
becomes institutionalised rather than another simply because it is easier to institutionalise or 
because it fits better with elements of the environment (Parsons 2003. 20). 
 
Europeanisation as a process of adaptation and learning 
Traditional foreign policy analysis focuses on the state as a unitary actor with given interests, 
understood mostly in material terms. However, this approach basically ignores the importance 
of norms, values or other social factors such as culture and national identity. Since the early 
1990s, a reaction to this ‘rationalist’ dominance has gradually evolved, resulting in a large 
literature more focused on the importance of norms and social factors. This article applies a 
social constructivist approach and discusses whether community norms influence national 
identities and approaches: more specifically, how the development of a certain idea of 
security - a comprehensive European security approach - also influences the national security 
approaches and identities of member-states. As Parsons has recently argued, ideas may not 
only ‘cause actors to make certain choices, but […] the institutionalisation of certain ideas 
gradually reconstructs the interests of powerful actors’ (Parsons 2003: 6).    
Since other factors – the changes in NATO, domestic politics, geopolitical shifts, etc. 
– also are relevant for understanding possible changes, the difficult challenge is to isolate the 
effects of Europeanisation. The following analysis seeks to identify the independent impact of 
the integration process by process-tracing, carefully examining the temporal order of various 
changes combined with a special focus on the language used in speeches, official texts and 
documents that express the national security identity.  
                                                 
5 The fact that the EU has developed institutional features beyond the original design and certainly beyond the purpose of 
managing economic interdependence also indicates that it is more than simply a successful intergovernmental regime. 
(Christiansen et al. 2001: 13) 
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The aim is to identify ‘the national security identity’, here understood as the ‘dominant 
national discourse on security’. This builds the understanding of nation-state identity put 
forward by Thomas Risse, who holds that nation-state identity distinguishes itself from other 
components of collective identity by taking longer to construct and by being deeply embedded 
in both institutions and a certain political culture (Risse 2001: 201-202). This means that it is 
possible to identify the security identity of a nation-state by studying official documents and 
speeches produced by the political leadership. Changes in this dominant national security 
discourse can therefore be understood as indicating a change in the nation-state’s security 
identity.  
Not all changes in this discourse that are a result of Europeanisation are also examples 
of an identity change. Some changes are merely a result of instrumental adaptation with an 
unchanged understanding of security. This is why it is important to distinguish between two 
forms of Europeanisation: adaptation and learning. While the first refers to changes that occur 
when actors merely adjust their behaviour to external factors, the second refers to changes in 
their preferences or identities. This difference is similar to Argyris and Schön’s concepts of 
‘single’ and ‘double-loop’ (or complex) learning (Argyris and Schön 1978: 2-3). As in the 
study on Europeanisation by Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, ‘learning’ will be used in this 
article only to refer to the latter form (Cowles et al. 2001: 12). This makes it easier to 
distinguish between strategic adjustments (adaptation) and identity change (learning).  
While both types of changes may be a result of Europeanisation, the former will tend 
to be somewhat more stable and enduring. According to Risse and Sikkink, however, these 
two types of change may be understood as representing different phases in the socialisation 
process (Risse and Sikkink 1999). According to this logic (the so-called spiral model) a 
socialisation process may be initiated when an actor starts instrumentally adjusting its 
discourse and actions to a community norm. This means that the actor tries to find ‘new’ ways 
of preserving traditional interests. Even though such a change cannot yet be characterised as 
socialisation, it marks the first step in that direction. In the end, the actor becomes convinced 
by the community’s discourse and the chances for socialisation or learning increase.6 Whether 
the changes in the French national discourse and approach that will be discussed below 
                                                 
6 While Risse and Sikkink developed their model for studying why certain authoritarian states start to comply with 
international human rights norms, I will argue that the basis in this model also may be used for explaining why states comply 
with EU norms. 
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represent an identity change or merely an instrumental adaptation will be further elaborated 
upon in the conclusion. 
 
Towards a Europeanisation of French foreign and security policy? 
Although there exist constructivist analyses of French foreign policy, their conclusions do not 
differ much from those of more traditional (rationalist) studies. While the constructivist or the 
rationalist studies are based on various different explanatory or interpretative factors, such as 
power politics,7 institutional centralisation8 or national culture or identity,9 they all seem to 
conclude that France has had one major foreign policy goal since the end of the Second World 
War: to re-establish its position in world politics – often referred to as la gloire et la grandeur 
de la France. This is then seen as the main explanation for the actions of French leaders on 
the international scene. This means that none of them incorporates the possibility of change or 
account for the possibility that international norms or structures may influence French 
national interests, identity and thereby also policy.  
Even though France has influenced (and still is influencing) the integration process in 
many respects, there are reasons to believe that the institutionalisation of a ‘comprehensive’ 
European foreign and security policy in the EU also influences French foreign and security 
policy. Thus, it might be ideas and collective norms rather than objective interests that must 
be taken into consideration if one wants to explain France’s current foreign and security 
policy (Parsons 2000). I will now move on to present the traditional French ambition of a 
                                                 
7 Analyses based on a realist approach generally argue that French foreign policy is a result of traditional power politics 
(Hoffmann 1965; Kramer 1994; Hoffmann 2000; Lansford 2002). France is seen as defending multilateralism and 
international law either because of its ‘weakness’ (compared with the USA), or because this is deemed the only way for 
France to have an important role in international politics. 
8 An institutionalist approach would emphasise the highly centralised political system in France, and point out that the realist 
approach is a result of the French political system. (Blunden 2000) The centralisation of political institutions and the strength 
of the French president mean that the French foreign policy is defined in almost a permanent symbiosis between the Elysée 
(the Presidential Palace) and the Quai d’Orsay (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Thus, it is not correct to see the Presidency, 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the Quai d’Orsay, the Minister of Defence and the Ministry of Finance as separate entities, 
engaging in regular but informal contacts. In practice, the leaders of these institutions are in uninterrupted contact, 
continuously informed of the same events, often before these are made public. Thus, the members of this group acquire a 
distinctive common culture;8 and this, according to Margaret Blunden, goes far in explaining the exceptional and much-noted 
continuity of French foreign policy. (Blunden 2000: 28-29). 
9 A constructivist approach would focus particularly on the importance of cultural factors and discourse. Even though this 
approach includes non-material factors like identity and culture, the conclusions are quite similar to those of traditional realist 
approaches. In practice, they interpret the importance of power politics in the French foreign policy discourse as an 
expression of French identity. (Larsen 1997; Holm 2000; Holm 2002; Gaffney 2004) Larsen, for instance, argues, ‘it can be 
said that the French discourse on the nature of international relations possessed many features of the realist school of thought. 
Norms and values, although present in the language, do not seem to be integrated in the main argument’ (Larsen 1997: 126). 
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French-dominated ‘Europe puissance’, which I argue was the most important element of the 
French nation-state security identity until the mid-1990s. Then I will discuss the extent to 
which this ambition has been challenged by some of the most important decisions in the EU 
with regard to shaping EU’s comprehensive security approach since the mid-1990s - the 
incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, the adoption of the draft 
Constitution and the European Security Strategy (ESS).  
 
The French ambition of ‘une Europe puissance’ 
Defence issues have played an important role in French history in general and in the creation 
of the French nation-state in particular. This is one reason why questions of defence and 
security have had a prominent place in thinking about security (Larsen, 1997). At both ends of 
the French political spectrum, a strong national defence is perceived as necessary. In fact, 
there has never been much support for pacifism in France, and historically there have been no 
strong peace movements. This can explain why there is no clear distinction between peace 
(where political means are used) and war (where military means are used) (David 1989). Even 
the French nuclear ‘dissuasion’ has been almost synonymous with security and peace in the 
French discourse (Larsen, 1997: 120).  
The main elements of the French defence reform in the 1990s – abandoning 
conscription, emphasis on power projection, spending and procurement cuts and 
procrastination on defence industrial restructuring – indicate that France continued to give 
priority to power projection over crisis management, peacekeeping or conflict prevention.  In 
reality, France was with this reform applying the lessons learned from the Gulf War and 
attempting (within the limits set by an ever-decreasing budget) to follow the US lead towards 
the information revolution in weapons systems (Howorth 1998).  
In addition, a main French foreign and security policy goal since the end of the Second 
World War has been to re-establish the country’s traditional role as a great power in 
international politics. However, the French leadership soon recognised that it was not realistic 
to try to achieve this goal alone. Thus, at a very early stage in the post-war period, the French 
turned this ambition into a European one. Through European integration it seemed possible to 
regain some of the lost grandeur and gloire. France aimed at developing a French-dominated 
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Europe - one which would be highly integrated (but not a federation)10 and independent of 
the USA (Bozo 1996). This explains the French positions in the integration process from the 
early 1950s until the early 1990s. In fact, it was the rationale behind the first integration 
initiatives proposed by France in the 1950s (the Schuman plan11 and the Pleven plan12) and 
the 1960s (the Fouchet plan13), but also the Maastricht treaty from 1992, which established a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, aiming at a common defence. So far the continuity in 
the French positions is striking.  
Even the French intentions of a return to NATO’s military structures in 1995 may be 
understood in this perspective.14 When France announced its intention to reintegrate the 
military structure in NATO, this was based on the changes in NATO and the perceived 
possibility of finally achieving an alliance with two equal partners – the EU and the USA. In 
fact, France had never sought to undermine the Alliance and throughout the Cold War had 
benefited enormously from its stabilising effects. What France had constantly proposed was a 
new balance within it, and in the mid-1990s there seemed to be a realistic prospect of finally 
achieving that goal (Howorth 2004: 215). While the USA and most NATO members 
welcomed the Maastricht Treaty and the development of a CFSP in 1994, they were more 
reluctant in 1996. There was, for instance, little will to make the changes in the command 
structure that France required – changes that would create a more equal relationship between 
the USA and Europe. When the French political leadership understood that NATO was not 
going to undertake such changes, they answered by aborting their plans to reintegrate into 
NATO’s military structures (Rieker 1998; Bacot-Décriaud 2004).15  
In many ways, France’s ambition has been to develop the EU as a security actor with 
an important military capability able to operate independently of the USA. This means that 
the French ambitions for EU security policy in the early 1990s went far beyond 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed analysis of the French discourse on Europe see Henrik Larsen (1997). 
11 to establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
12 to establish a Eurpopean Defence Community (EDC).  
13 to establish a European Political Union. 
14 France withdrew from the integrated military structures in NATO in 1966 as a reaction to the US dominance in the 
alliance, and in 1995 it opened up for a possible reintegration into these structures (Rieker 1998). 
15 The French rapprochement to NATO has also been interpreted as an indication of an important change in French foreign 
and security policy, away from its ambition of an independent and common European defence (Rynning 1999; Rynning 
2000).  It is argued that even though France aborted its plans for reintegration, it strengthened its cooperation within the 
military forces of this alliance, both in the preparations for the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces and in the 
practicalities of real deployments, such as NATO ‘Extraction Force’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, that 
provided the nucleus of the KFOR deployment during and after the Kosovo crisis (Clarke 2000: 727), and more recently the 
French contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF).   
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comprehensive security and international crisis management. In fact in an opening speech at 
the Palais des Congrès in Paris 10 January 1992, Mitterand even spoke of the possibility of 
having a common European nuclear doctrine: 
Only two of the twelve are nuclear powers. For their national politics, they have a clear 
doctrine. Is it possible to think of a European doctrine? This question will soon become one of 
the major questions in the development of a common European defence (Mitterand 1992, my 
translation).16 
 
This was rather surprising, given the French tradition of being militarily independent. 
However, the 1994 French White Book on defence modified the concept of French military 
independence, and emphasised that the French perception of national vital interest was from 
now on to be coordinated with that of other European countries: 
The questions that will be raised in the perspective of developing a common European defence 
within the framework of the European Union must not fall out of sight. In fact, one cannot not 
exclude that, in the long run, when the interests of the European nations are moving closer to 
one another, the idea that France has of its vital interests will coincide with those of its 
neighbours (La documentation française 1994 : 24-25, my translation).17 
 
Together with Chirac’s decision to go ahead with nuclear tests despite heavy criticism, his 
decision to initiate a radical transformation of the French defence forces in 1996 (Ministère de 
la Défence 1996) may be seen as an attempt to show that his country was both able and 
willing to take the lead in the process towards the establishment of a credible European 
security and defence policy. In the official document (le projet de loi) it is argued that the 
French national defence contributes to the creation of a credible European defence: 
The [national] defence policy will serve the construction of a credible European Defence, both 
the creation of armed branch of the European Union and the strengthening of the European 
pillar within the Alliance […] France therefore wishes the establishment, under the authority 
of the European Council, of an ambitious common security and defence policy (Ministère de 
la Défence 1996 : 1.2.2, my translation).18  
 
                                                 
16 Seuls deux des Douze sont déteneur d’une force atomique. Pour leur politique nationale, ils ont une doctrine claire. Est-il 
possible de concevoir une doctrine européenne ? Cette question-là deviendra très vite une des questions majeures de la 
construction d’une défense européenne commune (Mitterand 1992). 
17 Les questions ouvertes par la perspective de la construction d’une défense européenne commune dans le cadre de l’Union 
européenne ne doivent pas être perdues de vue. Il ne peut être exclu en effet, à long terme, qu’à mesure que se rapprocheront 
les intérêts des nations européennes, la conception qu’a la France de ses intérêts vitaux n’en vienne à coïncider avec celle de 
ses voisins (La documentation française 1994 : 24-25). 
18 La politique de défense servira la construction d’une défense européenne credible, à la fois bras armé de l’Union 
européenne et moyen de renforcer le pilier européenne de l’Alliance. […] la France souhaite donc la mise en place, sous 
l’eutorité du Coseil européen, d’une politique commune de securté et défense ambitieuse (Ministère de la Défence 1996 : 
1.2.2).  
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This statement was made only a few months before the opening of the Intergovernmental 
Conference where the EU member-states aimed at a revision of the Maastricht Treaty, 
including a concretisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The fact that 
also Chirac refers to the possibility of giving France’s nuclear assets a European role in the 
future indicates that the French conception of a European defence also at that time went 
beyond international crisis management and peacekeeping: 
I have indicated that the French nuclear force […] could play a role if the European defence 
[…] is developing (Chirac 1996, my translation).19 
 
This means that France’s ambitions for developing a common European defence also 
transcended the Petersberg tasks20 that were included in the Treaty of the Amsterdam 
European Council in 1997. 
 
The effects of the Amsterdam Treaty  
The summit of Amsterdam was in many ways a disappointment for the French political 
leadership, who had hoped for a decision that could provide the EU with an independent 
defence role, involving a merger of the WEU and the EU. Instead this summit saw the 
introduction of the Petersberg tasks, which must be understood as a first step towards 
developing the EU as a comprehensive security actor. From now on, EU security policy 
would progress in a different direction, leaving the ambition of creating ‘une Europe 
puissance à la Française’ and focusing instead on the security policy means at the disposal of 
the EU in addition to military means. Certain countries, however, perceived this summit as a 
success precisely because they had managed to turn the EU’s focus away from the ambition of 
creating a ‘common defence’. 21  
                                                 
19 J’ai indiqué que la force nucléaire française […] pouvait être un élément, dans la mesure où la défense européenne […] se 
développerait (Chirac 1996).  
20 Referring to a WEU Ministerial Council meeting in June 1992, held at Petersberg Hotel near Bonn, where the member-
states of this organisation had decided that the WEU should aim at carrying out ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’. 
21 The Swedish–Finnish initiative, taken during the 1996 intergovernmental conference (IGC), to include the ‘Petersberg 
tasks’21 in the Treaty (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: V.J.7), must be understood as an attempt to provide reassurance that the 
‘European security dimension’ would be limited to crisis management, and thus not include the collective defence dimension 
that had been stipulated as a long-term goal in the Maastricht Treaty.   
  
 
 
14
At a press conference after the Amsterdam summit, Jacques Chirac expressed a certain 
disappointment with the result. While he welcomed and recognised the progress that was 
made, he also emphasised that this progress was limited: 
We have made a step, not a big step, but still a step that we would not have taken two or three 
months ago, concerning European defence, by moving the European Union and WEU closer 
together. […]. In the same way, we have improved a certain number of procedures, linked for 
instance to military actions, especially in the humanitarian area and in the area of 
peacekeeping […] (Chirac 1997, my translation).22 
 
At this point,  France still saw this progress as a first step towards the realisation of its long-
term goal of a common defence, rather than a reorientation towards comprehensive security. 
However, only a few years later, in December 1999, Chirac was to focus more explicitly on 
the value of the diversity of the EU toolbox in crisis management. In an interview with the 
magazine Armées d’aujourd’hui he argued: 
the construction of a European defence is a major ambition of our country. We want the 
Europeans to get the capacity to take common decisions and to undertake military operations 
within the framework of comprehensive crisis management, which includes diplomatic, 
economic and military means. It is the important strength of the European Union that it may 
engage in all the aspects of a crisis. This doesn’t mean that it will replace the Atlantic 
Alliance, which remains a legitimate framework for collective defence and its role in crisis 
management (Chirac 1999, my translation).23 
 
While French political elites continue to refer to ‘Europe puissance’ and ‘Europe defence’, the 
meaning of these concepts seems to have changed slightly. In addition to the focus on ‘crisis 
management’ instead of ‘common defence’, the concept of ‘conflict prevention’ seems now to 
have become the key issue also for France: 
We should establish as an ambition the need to develop Europe as the major political actor of 
tomorrow, and we should proceed so that this project will answer to the large ambition of the 
people. ‘Europe puissance’? Political Europe ? Beyond the label, it is all about responding to a 
need: playing an important role for creating peace in the world. The European Union can and 
should work for the reduction of international tensions because prevention is the best 
guarantee for security (Chirac 2000, my translation).24 
                                                 
22 On a fait un pas, pas un pas considérable, mais enfin un pas que l’on n’aurait pas fait il y a encore 2 ou 3 mois, pour ce qui 
concerne l’Europe de la défense, en rapprochant l’Union euroéenne de l’UEO. […]. De la même façon, nous avons amélioré 
un certain nombre de procédures, notamment liées aux actions militaires de l’Europe, en particulier dans le domaine 
humanitaire et dans le domaine du maintien de la paix […](Chirac 1997). 
23 La construction de l’Europe de la défense est une ambition majeure pour notre pays. Nous voulons que les Européens aient 
les moyens de décider ensemble et de conduire des opérations militaires dans le cadre de la gestion globale d’une crise, à la 
fois diplomatique, économique et militaire. C’est la grande force de l’Union européenne que de pouvoir agir sur tous les 
aspects d’une crise. Il ne s’agit pas de se substituer à l’Alliance atlantique qui demeure le cadre légitime de la défense 
collective et à sa place dans la gestions des crises (Chirac 1999). 
24 Nous devons nous fixer pour ambition de faire de l’Europe un acteur politique de premier plan dans le monde de demain, 
et nous devons faire en sorte que ce projet réponde à une large ambition populaire. Europe puissance? Europe politique? Au-
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The new  ‘loi de programmation militaire’ for the period 2002-2008, presented by the French 
Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie in September 2002, shows a continued will to 
modernise the French defence force. In an article titled ‘La programmation militaire: une 
ambition pour la France, pour l’Europe’, the defence minister shows that France’s ambitions 
are in fact equivalent to those of Europe. It is also clear from the text that it is ‘crisis 
management’ rather than ‘European defence’ that is referred to: 
We mainly use our effort on a European perspective because we believe this is the best way to 
proceed. […] This effort would support the role of France in the world and make our armed 
forces able to participate in all kinds of peace-building and peacekeeping missions, while 
preserving our decision-making and acting autonomy. It will make it possible for France to 
strengthen its political and military importance in Europe. […] Since 1996, the international 
framework of our defence policy has been changing. European defence has taken a new 
dimension since the initiatives taken by France together with its main partners. Their 
propositions, approved by the fifteen, have made it possible to concretise the institutional basis 
for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and fix the military objectives for a 
European capacity for crisis management (Ministère de la Défence 2002, my translation).25 
 
While France is increasingly referring to crisis management and peacekeeping in the 
European context it is important to note that the aims of the French national military still 
contain elements focused more on offensive capacity. This is especially evident where the 
possibilities of ‘pre-emptive action’ are referred to, even though the precise meaning of this 
concept remains unclear: 
Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection, we must be capable 
of detecting the threats as early as possible. Thus, the possibility of pre-emptive action may be 
an option when a serious threat is recognised (Ministère de la Défence 2002, my translation).26 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
delà de la formule, il s’agit de répondre à une nécessité : jouer un rôle majeur pour la paix dans le monde. L’Union 
Européenne peut et doit œuvrer à la réduction des tensions internationales car la prévention demeure la meilleure garantie de 
sécurité (Chirac 2000). 
25 Nous plaçons d’abord notre effort dans une perspective résolument européenne car nous pensons que cette voix est la 
meilleure […]. Cet effort doit permettre, en préservant notre autonomie de décision et d’action, de conforter la place de la 
France dans le monde, en mettant nos forces armées en mesure de participer à tous les types de missions de rétablissement et 
de maintient de la paix. Il permettra à la France de renforcer son poids politique et militaire en Europe. […] Depuis 1996, le 
cadre international de notre politique de défense se transforme. L’Europe de la défense a pris une dimension nouvelle depuis 
les initiatives prises par la France avec ses principaux partenaires. Leurs propositions, soumises et approuvées par les Quinze, 
ont permis de concrétiser les fondements institutionels de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) et de fixer 
les objectifs militaires d’une capacité européenne de gestion de crises (Ministère de la Défence 2002). 
26 A l’extérieur de nos frontières, dans le cadre de la prévention et de la projection – action, nous devons donc être en mesure 
d’identifier et de prévenir les menaces le plus tôt possible. Dans ce cadre, la possibilité d’une action préemptive pourrait être 
considérée, dès lors qu’une situation de menace explicite et avérée serait reconnue (Ministère de la Défence 2002). 
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Still, France perceives itself as the driving force in the development of ESDP, and the official 
text ends with a confirmation of the importance of developing a European defence:  
The implementation of this programme will make it possible for France to play the role of an 
engine in the construction of a European defence, respecting our alliances and our 
international engagements (Ministère de la Défence 2002, my translation).27 
 
While this indicates a certain continuity, it still seems likely that there has been a shift in the 
French discourse after the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty, towards an 
increased focus on comprehensive crisis management. As we shall see, this tendency appears 
stronger after the preparation process leading up to the draft Constitution and the development 
of the European Security Strategy (ESS). 
 
Impact of the Convention process and the ESS  
In fact, some of the French proposals in the Convention may be characterised as proposals 
aimed at strengthening the EU as a comprehensive security actor. This is especially true 
concerning the question of an EU foreign minister. Such a minister will be responsible for 
both the Commission’s and the Council’s tools in this area, thereby facilitating coordination 
among different policy areas and different institutions. In fact, the French political leaders 
seem increasingly preoccupied with showing how their country can contribute to the 
realisation of the comprehensive security aspects in the EU.  
First, the adoption of a European Security Strategy (ESS) seems to have led to even 
greater emphasis on international crisis management comprehensive security in the French 
discourse. A move beyond European defence can be identified in a recent speech made by the 
French Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie: 
The year 2003, no one can deny it, has led to spectacular progress in European defence. In 
fact, the last Council of Brussels, which met in December 2003, adopted a European security 
strategy, which provides the proof that the Europeans, both by pragmatism and ambition, are 
capable of defining a common conception of the challenges in the world, in order to be able to 
improve their common security. This has led to a recognition of the urgent need of creating a 
unit for planning and commanding operations. This has been important progress, an essential 
                                                 
27 La mise en oevre de ce programme « permettra à la France de jouer un role moteur dans la construction de l’Europe de la 
défense, dans le respect de nos alliances et de nos engagements internationaux » (Ministère de la Défence 2002). 
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element. This step must now be made more specific to optimise the crisis management 
capacity of the European Union (Alliot-Marie 2004, my translation).28 
 
A speech by the French Minister Delegate for European Affairs, Claudie Haigneré, makes 
even more explicit reference to the importance of comprehensive security: 
The European Union has gradually developed a common perception of European security. The 
European security strategy, adopted in December 2003, is an essential step forward on which 
one must continue to work. This strategy puts emphasis, rightly so, on the new challenges: the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, of course, on terrorism. The fight against 
terrorism, in all its forms, is a priority that needs that the Union implement the whole range of 
its means – diplomatic, military, but also police cooperation (Haigneré 2004, my translation).29 
 
The French have also managed to match this comprehensive discourse with concrete actions. 
The French-led EU operation in Congo in June 2003 may be seen as an implementation of 
EU’s comprehensive security approach. This operation was undertaken at the request of the 
UN and in close cooperation with civilian actors in the area. Another example is the decision, 
based on a French proposal and made by the defence ministers of France, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands in September 2004, to form a joint paramilitary force to conduct 
peacekeeping operations that do not require the advanced skills of soldiers but which are too 
dangerous for civilians and NGOs. Such a force would aim at helping to bridge the gap 
between military and civilian peacekeeping operations. The agreement involved creating a 
3,000-person strong Gendarmerie Force, based in Vicenza in northeast Italy and designed to 
help restore public order to regions emerging from conflicts, such as the Balkans and beyond. 
As the French Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie, recently argued: 
The creation of a European paramilitary force […] will make it possible to complete the range 
of capacities for crisis management that today exist, by having a specific response to the 
transition phase between military and civilian means (Alliot-Marie 2004, my translation).30  
                                                 
28 L’année 2003, personne ne peut le contester, a permis de faire progresser l’Europe de la défense se manière spectaculaire. 
Le dernier Conseil de Bruxelles, réuni en décembre 2003, a notamment permis l’adoption de la stratégie européenne de 
sécurité, apportant ainsi la preuve que les Européens, autant par pragmatisme que par ambition, sont capable de définir une 
ligne de lecture commune des défis de ce monde, afin de mieux garantir leur sécurité collective. Elle a également fait 
apparaître la prise en compte du besoin avéré d’une cellule de planification et de conduite des opérations. C’était un grand 
progrès, un élément essentiel. Cette démarche doit maintenant se concrétiser pour optimiser la capacité de gestion de crise de 
l’Union européenne (Alliot-Marie 2004). 
29 L’Union Européenne a développé progressivement une perception commune de la sécurité européenne. La stratégie 
européenne de sécurité, adoptée en décembre 2003, est une premiére étape essentielle à laquelle il faut continuer à travailler. 
Cette stratégie met l’accent, à juste titre, sur les nouveaux défis : la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et, bien 
sür, le terrorisme. La lutte contre le terrorisme, sous toutes ses formes, est une priorité qui suppose que l’Union mette en 
œuvre l’ensemble des moyens diplomatiques, militaires, mais aussi la coopération policière et judiciaire (Haigneré 2004). 
30 La création d’une force de gendarmerie européenne […] permettra de compléter la gamme des moyens de gestion des 
crises aujourd’hui disponibles, en permettant notamment d’avoir une réponse spécifique pour la phase de transition entre les 
volets militaire et civil (Alliot-Marie 2004). 
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From these examples we can see that France has not only adopted a comprehensive security 
discourse, but is also eager to take the lead in strengthening the EU as a comprehensive 
security actor.  
 
 
Conclusion 
French diplomacy and security policy-making are known for their awareness of strategic 
vision; a clear understanding driven from the very top of what France wants to achieve in a 
medium- to long-term frame, based on a shared sense of its own identity and purpose, imbued 
with confidence in the national role France should play (Clarke 2000: 729). It is interesting to 
note, however, that the content of this strategic vision may have been somewhat modified by 
influence from the EU. As I have shown here, French ambitions for a European defence seem 
to have been oriented away from a more military and offensive approach. Increasingly, also 
the political leaders of France appear to have recognised a comprehensive security approach 
as the guiding principle for EU security policy.  
But do these changes really mean that the French political leadership has abandoned 
its long-held ambition of a common European defence in the traditional sense? Has the 
French foreign and security identity changed – perhaps through a learning process – and  
become increasingly oriented towards a comprehensive security approach? Or is this change 
in discourse merely the result of an instrumental adaptation to a changed environment, with 
the French ambition of an independent European defence policy remaining the ultimate long-
term goal?  
While the changes observed in French foreign and security policy are interesting, they 
should be viewed with caution. It is unlikely that they signify that France has suddenly 
become a promoter of ‘soft-power’ Europe (Holm 2003; Holm 2004). Also important to bear 
in mind is the fact that different countries may read similar discourses through different 
cognitive and normative lenses (Howorth 2004: 231). All the same, the changes identified in 
this article do indicate some new trends. That the civilian and military instruments are 
increasingly seen as a whole, and that the EU as a post-modern security actor focusing on 
comprehensive security is supported also by France, both indicate a modification of France’s 
ambition of creating a European defence in the more traditional sense.  
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While some smaller member-states, like Sweden, have actively supported the 
development of a comprehensive security policy in the EU, this development rather seems to 
be the result of the special character of the EU as a security actor. That the EU is a tightly 
coupled security community, with no institutionalised security policy from the past, seems to 
have facilitated the adoption of such ideas of security. The shift in the French security 
approach, which seems to have taken place shortly after some important changes in the EU, 
may therefore be interpreted as a result of a process of adaptation and learning within the EU. 
While such a Europeanisation process is likely to start with instrumental adaptation, it may, as 
the spiral model presented by Risse and Sikkink indicates, lead to learning and interest and 
identity change in the longer run. Thus, while the changes in the national discourse in the 
early 1990s and in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty may be characterised as 
instrumental adaptation, the more recent changes, which also have been followed by concrete 
comprehensive security proposals from France, may mark the beginning of a more profound 
change in France’s national interests and identity. 
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